Registered in 1996, the domain Redfield.com last sold for $8,158 dollars in late 2021, according to NameBio.
Its registrant listed it for sale with an asking price of approximately $50,000 dollars. The domain appears to be a generic, two word compound of “red” and “field.”
Meanwhile, Texas-based Academy Ltd. filed a UDRP to get the domain, which they owned prior to its registration lapsing. They lost the case, based on the Respondent’s claims that in India, where they reside, the mark is not known.
The three member panel ordered the domain to remain with the Respondent and slapped the Complainant with a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, stating that this UDRP was filed as a “Plan B” option.
Copyright © 2024 DomainGang.com · All Rights Reserved.Academy, Ltd. v. Ramesh Singh
Claim Number: FA2301002026883
PARTIES
Complainant is Academy, Ltd. (“Complainant”), represented by Darin M. Klemchuk of Klemchuk LLP, Texas, USA. Respondent is Ramesh Singh (“Respondent”), represented by Ankur Raheja of CyLaw Solutions, India.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is , registered with BigRock Solutions Ltd.
PANEL
The undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in serving as Panelists in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panel Chair
Gerald M. Levine, Panelist
Sandra J. Franklin, Panelist
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on January 10, 2023; Forum received payment on January 10, 2023.
On January 16, 2023, BigRock Solutions Ltd confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with BigRock Solutions Ltd and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. BigRock Solutions Ltd has verified that Respondent is bound by the BigRock Solutions Ltd registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 17, 2023, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of February 10, 2023 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@redfield.com. Also on January 17, 2023, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on February 10, 2023.
On February 15, 2023 pursuant to Respondent’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Gerald M. Levine and Sandra J. Franklin as Panelists.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) “to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent” through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant is a retailer of sporting goods and outdoor recreation equipment. It has rights in the REDFIELD mark through its numerous registrations of the mark, including with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the REDFIELD mark as it fully incorporates the mark, merely adding the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He has no relationship with Complainant, Complainant has not licensed or authorized him to use its REDFIELD mark, and he is not commonly known by the Domain Name. He is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it to redirect Internet users to a landing page offering the Domain Name for sale, and he has failed to develop an active website resolving from it.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He acquired it when Complainant inadvertently allowed its registration of the Domain Name to lapse and did so with constructive or actual knowledge of Complainant and its rights in the REDFIELD mark. He attempts for commercial gain to attract internet users to his website by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, endorsement or affiliation of his website with Complainant. He registered the Domain Name primarily to sell it for more than his direct costs associated with it and refuses to engage in good faith negotiations with Complainant to purchase the Domain Name despite notice of Complainant’s rights. Respondent exhibits a pattern of bad faith, as shown by his ownership of hundreds of domain names.
B. Respondent
Respondent is a domain name investor who purchases large numbers of common-word and inherently valuable domain names for the purpose of offering them for sale to third parties. This is a legitimate business. He acquired the Domain Name for $8,166.67 at a domain name auction on November 28, 2021 and holds it as part of his stock in trade.
“Redfield” is a commonly used term. Respondent bought the Domain Name because of its inherent value as a common-word domain name. It is a common surname of individuals and name of geographical places. Respondent has no presence in the United States or Canada and had no knowledge of Complainant or its REDFIELD mark when he acquired the Domain Name. For these reasons he has rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in good faith. First, he acquired it because of its inherent value and not on account of any correspondence it might have to a particular trademark. He did not acquire it to target Complainant. Complainant has demonstrated no presence in Respondent’s home country of India, and in fact Respondent had no knowledge of Complainant when he bought the Domain Name. Complainant alleges that Respondent’s continuing to offer the Domain Name for sale for $49,500 even after Complainant notified him of its interest in the Domain Name constitutes bad faith, but Complainant was not even willing to pay Respondent the amount of money he paid for the Domain Name, and Respondent was within his rights to continue his general offer to sell it. Respondent did not approach Complainant with an offer to sell the Domain Name—it was Complainant who approached Respondent for that purpose. There is no evidence that Respondent targeted Complainant and in the absence of such evidence there can be no showing that Respondent registered or has used the Domain Name in bad faith.
FINDINGS
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
The REDFIELD mark was registered to Complainant with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) (Reg. No. 0361404) on August 9, 1974 (CIPO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B). Complainant’s registration of its mark with a governmental trademark authority such as the CIPO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Wang Liqun, FA 1625332 (Forum July 17, 2015) (finding, “Registration of a mark with a governmental authority (or, in this case, multiple governmental authorities) is sufficient to establish rights in the mark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)”).
The Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s REDFIELD mark. It incorporates the mark in its entirety, merely adding the “.com” gTLD to the mark. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark. Marquette Golf Club v. Al Perkins, FA 1738263 (Forum July 27, 2017) (“When a respondent’s domain name incorporates a mark in its entirety and merely adds a generic top-level domain (gTLD), “.com”, then the Panel may find that the disputed domain name is identical to Complainant’s mark.”), Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association v. Shi Lei aka Shilei, FA 1784643 (Forum June 18, 2018) (“A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs.”). The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the change described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
Respondent does not contest the Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) element of the case.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the REDFIELD mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) he has no relationship with Complainant, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized him to use its REDFIELD mark, (iii) he is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (iv) he is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it to redirect Internet users to a landing page offering the Domain Name for sale, and (v) he has failed to develop an active website resolving from it. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant states that Respondent has no relationship with Complainant and that Complainant has not licensed him to use its REDFIELD mark. Complainant has specific competence to make these statements, and they are unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit A and the information furnished to Forum by the registrar list “Ramesh Singh” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that the Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complaint Exhibit C is a screenshot of the landing page at to which the Domain Name resolves. It consists solely of a general offer to sell the Domain Name and invites inquiry from interested persons. No sales price is advertised. Complaint Exhibit D includes a letter from Complainant’s counsel to the entity that was then listed as the registrant of the Domain Name (Global IP Holdings) explaining that Complainant previously owned the Domain Name and inadvertently allowed it to lapse. It requested that the holder sell it to Complainant for a reasonable price. Complaint Exhibit E consists of copies of emails between Complainant’s counsel and Respondent discussing a potential sale of the Domain Name to Complainant. Respondent explained that he paid $8,158 for the Domain Name and considers it a valuable asset. Complainant offered $5,000 for it. Respondent declined to sell it for that amount, pointing out that it is well below what he paid for it, that Redfield is a very common name having over 31 million results on a Google search, and that he was not aware of Complainant or its mark when he acquired the Domain Name. Complainant’s counsel requested Respondent to furnish a counterproposal and pointed out that its mark had been registered for approximately 100 years. Respondent did not reply, and that is the end of the email chain. At some point during this correspondence Complainant’s counsel indicated that he was aware of Respondent’s asking price of $49,500 for the Domain Name. Complaint Exhibit F is a screenshot of the Go-Daddy website showing that the Domain Name is in fact for sale at that price. Finally, Complaint Exhibit G is a list of domain names registered by Respondent. It is several pages long and Complainant states that it contains more than two hundred domain names. It is offered to demonstrate what Complainant characterizes as “a pattern and practice of bad faith conduct within the meaning of Paragraph 4(b). Indeed, the overall impression is that Respondent identifies and purchases domain names consisting of popular names or brands, [not] for the bona fide buying and selling of goods, but for the sole purpose of reselling those domain names for significant profit.”
Complainant’s evidence in support of a prima facie case of no rights or legitimate interests demonstrates that Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant and that Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, that Respondent is making a general offer to sell it at a price of $49,500, and that Respondent is making no other use of it. Taking this evidence most favorably to Complainant, and ignoring the fact that Complainant should have recognized that Respondent is a domain investor, the Panel finds that Complainant has made its prima facie case. It is thus incumbent upon Respondent to demonstrate that he does have rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
To that end, Respondent shows that he is a domain investor. Complaint Exhibit G and Response Annex II are lists of many domain names in addition to the Domain Name involved in this proceeding that Respondent has acquired as inventory, or stock in trade. Investing in common-word domain names is a perfectly legitimate business and can qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services so long as the Respondent did not target a specific complainant or protected mark with a particular domain name. Platterz Inc. v. Andrew Melcher, FA 1729887 (Forum June 19, 2017) (holding that “investing in genuinely generic terms, for purpose of resale, is a legitimate business and that the acquisition of domain names consisting of common, dictionary terms for resale can confer rights and legitimate interests upon entrepreneurs who engage in this activity”), Walsh Bishop Assocs. v. Honggi, Honggi Kim, FA 907521 (Forum Mar. 6, 2007) (“[A] respondent may have a legitimate interest in a domain name if the domain name is used to profit from the generic value of the word, without intending to take advantage of complainant’s rights in that word.”), Franklin Mint Fed. Credit Union v. GNO, Inc., FA 860527 (Forum Mar. 9, 2007) (concluding that the respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because it was a generic domain name reseller who owned numerous four-letter domain names).
That REDFIELD is a common-word mark is amply demonstrated by Response Annexes IV.a, a <forebears.io/surnames/redfield> printout showing that approximately 3,927 people, mostly in the United States, have Redfield as a surname, IV.b consisting of screenshots of numerous other websites utilizing “redfield” in the domain name, V consisting of a Wikipedia list of a number of geographic places using that name and screenshots of the websites of many of those places, and VI consisting of registration certificates issued by various governmental trademark authorities in places other than India for registered marks incorporating the word “redfield.”
Further, there is no evidence that Respondent was aware of Complainant or its mark when it acquired the Domain Name. In determining whether a respondent actually knew of the complainant and its rights in the relevant mark when the domain name was registered, panels have looked at many different types of evidence, including but not limited to the use of a domain name in direct competition with a trademark owner, impersonation, the parties operating in the same market segment, the parties being physically located in the same general geographic area, a pattern of bad faith conduct, and the fanciful or famous nature of a trademark, suggesting that any similarity is not happenstance. In this case, there is no evidence of Respondent using the Domain Name to compete with Complainant, of impersonation, or of the parties operating in the same market segment or geographic location. According to unsupported allegations in the Complaint, Complainant is a sporting goods retailer operating in some 28 states in the United states, and to some unspecified extent in Canada, South Korea, the European Union, and China, holding governmental registrations of its mark in all of those jurisdictions (registration certificates included in Complaint Exhibit B). It shows no evidence of the nature or extent of its operations, however, and shows no evidence of any presence in India, the country of Respondent’s domicile. In short, there is nothing in the evidence before the Panel to suggest that Respondent was aware of Complainant or its REDFIELD mark when he acquired the Domain Name, and thus no evidence of targeting.
In summary, before any notice to him of Complainant’s claims to the Domain Name, the Respondent was using it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by in Policy ¶ 4(c)(i). He has thus demonstrated rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Respondent having demonstrated his rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name, it is not necessary for the Panel to address the bad faith element. Netsertive, Inc. v. Ryan Howard / Howard Technologies, Ltd., FA 1721637 (Forum Apr. 17, 2017) (finding that because the complainant must prove all three elements under the Policy, the complainant’s failure to prove one of the elements makes further inquiry into the remaining element unnecessary), Wasatch Shutter Design v. Duane Howell / The Blindman, FA 1731056 (Forum June 23, 2017) (deciding not to inquire into the respondent’s rights or legitimate interests or its registration and use in bad faith where the complainant could not satisfy the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)). Nevertheless, because Respondent has requested a finding of reverse domain name hijacking, the Panel elects to address this element.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of no bad faith registration or use of the Domain Name. Complainant alleges that Respondent acquired the Domain Name with constructive and actual knowledge of Complainant and its REDFIELD mark. Arguments of bad faith based on constructive notice are generally rejected. Panels have most frequently declined to find bad faith based upon constructive knowledge. The Way Int’l, Inc. v. Diamond Peters, D2003-0264 (WIPO May 29, 2003) (“As to constructive knowledge, the Panel takes the view that there is no place for such a concept under the Policy.”). As fully discussed above, Respondent did not have actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when he acquired the Domain Name.
Also as discussed above, Respondent is in the business of selling domain names. It is well settled that a general offer to sell a domain name in and of itself does not constitute bad faith. LifePlan v. Life Plan, FA 94826 (Forum July 13, 2000) (“[T]he mere offering [of the domain name for sale], without more, does not indicate circumstances suggesting that Respondent registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or transferring the domain name to the Complainant as required under [Policy ¶ 4(b)(i)].”). Selling generic domain names may be done in good faith absent evidence of an intent to harm a complainant. Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc. v. This Domain for Sale, Toll Free: 866-822-9073 Worldwide: 339-222-5132 a/k/a BuyDomains.com, FA 1202001428939 (Forum Mar. 16, 2012) (finding that the respondent did not register the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling the disputed domain name to the complainant or its competitors under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i), where the respondent stated that it buys domain names considered to be generic so that it may resell them at a later date), John Fairfax Publ’n Pty Ltd v. Domain Names 4U, D2000-1403 (WIPO Dec. 13, 2000) (finding legitimate interests and no bad faith registration where the respondent is a seller of generic domain names). Further, when a Respondent has established rights or legitimate interests in a domain name its registration of that name with intent to sell it is not a registration in bad faith. Etam, plc v. Alberta Hot Rods, D2000-1654 (WIPO Jan. 31, 2001) (“Respondent’s offer to sell the domain name does not constitute bad faith, in light of the fact that it has a legitimate interest in the domain name”). The evidence before the Panel does not demonstrate bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(b)(i).
Complainant argues that Respondent’s continuing to offer the Domain Name for sale even after he learned of Complainant’s claims constitutes bad faith. Even if true, this argument would not answer the UDRP requirement for a complainant to show both bad faith registration and use. Even without that requirement, however, this argument fails, because Respondent has demonstrated rights and legitimate interest in the Domain Name. He is entitled to make whatever lawful use of it he chooses, and offering it for sale as part of his stock in trade under the circumstances present in this case is entirely within his rights, regardless of Complainant’s claims to the Domain Name. Record Connect, Inc. v. Chung Kit Lam / La-Fame Corporation, FA 1693876 (Forum Nov. 3, 2016) (finding that the issue of bad faith registration and use was moot once the panel found the respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name), Sheet Labels, Inc. v. Harnett, Andy, FA 1701423 (Forum Jan. 4, 2017) (finding that because the respondent had rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, its registration of the name was not in bad faith).
Complainant argues also that Respondent is using the confusingly similar Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to his website by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, endorsement or affiliation of his website with complainant. Here again, the fact that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the Domain Name means that he is entitled to advertise it for sale in the manner which he has chosen. The fact that it is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark does not alter or diminish this right in any way.
Finally, the fact that Respondent has registered numerous names does not demonstrate a pattern of bad faith registrations. The domain names on the lists of those he has registered are common-word names which are part of his stock in trade, his inventory. If anything, the lists support Respondent’s position, demonstrating that he is engaged in the legitimate business of domain investing. It is not evidence of bad faith registration or use.
In conclusion, Respondent did not register and is not using the Domain Name in bad faith.
REVERSE DOMAIN NAME HIJACKING
Respondent requests a finding of reverse domain name hijacking. This is defined in Rule 1 as “using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain name.” Rule 15(e) provides as follows:
If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.
Complainant and its counsel knew or should have known when they obtained the Complaint Exhibit G reverse WHOIS printout from https://viewdns.info that this Respondent was very likely a domain investor and that this business is universally accepted as legitimate by UDRP panels. They also knew or should have known that their REDFIELD mark was relatively weak and in use by many individuals and entities throughout the United States at a minimum. Any reliance they may have placed upon constructive notice of their rights was utterly without justification in light of the almost universal rejection of that theory by UDRP panels, and they had no basis whatever to suppose that this Respondent had actual knowledge of them or their rights in the REDFIELD mark. In short, they had no reason to believe they could prove either the Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) or (iii) element of their case. This Complaint should not have been filed and it was an abuse of the UDRP for Complainant to do so. It is undisputed that Complainant attempted unsuccessfully to buy the Domain Name from Respondent in the fall of 2022, and this action followed. For the foregoing reasons the Panel is convinced that Complainant filed this action in bad faith, perhaps as an alternative acquisition strategy, but in any event without any legal or factual basis for its claims.
DECISION
Complainant having failed to establish all of the elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the domain name REMAIN WITH RESPONDENT.
Further, the Panel finds and declares that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
Gerald M. Kevine, Panelist
Sandra J Franklin, Panelist
Dated: February 21, 2023
