The domain name Sesame-ai.pro was disputed by Sesame AI, Inc. of the United States against Jingyi Huang of China.
Complainant, represented by SoCal IP Law Group, operates from the domain Sesame.com and just six months ago raised $200 million at a $1 billion valuation. It argued that Respondent’s domain imitated its brand and site layout, pointing to cloned text, images, and buttons designed to confuse users and exploit goodwill.
Respondent countered that “sesame” is a generic word chosen for its metaphorical connection to AI, and that the site was used for independent commentary with disclaimers, admitting only to a brief placeholder period where content from Complainant’s site was copied.
The Panel noted Complainant’s reliance on pending trademark applications and alleged common law rights in SESAME and SESAME AI but found only seven months of marketplace use, supported by four articles, to be insufficient to establish secondary meaning.
Final decision: the Panel denied the Complaint and ordered that sesame-ai.pro remain with Respondent.
Copyright © 2025 DomainGang.com · All Rights Reserved.Sesame AI, Inc. v. Jingyi Huang
Claim Number: FA2509002177996
PARTIES
Complainant is Sesame AI, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Jonathan Pearce of SoCal IP Law Group, LLP, California, USA. Respondent is Jingyi Huang (“Respondent”), China.
REGISTRAR AND Disputed Domain Name
The domain name at issue is sesame-ai.pro, registered with Dynadot Inc. (the “Disputed Domain Name”).
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge have no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Kendall C. Reed as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on September 19, 2025; Forum received payment on September 19, 2025.
On September 22, 2025, Dynadot Inc confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the sesame-ai.pro domain name is registered with Dynadot Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Dynadot Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Dynadot Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On September 23, 2025, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of October 14, 2025 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@sesame-ai.pro. Also on September 23, 2025, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on September 23, 2025.
On September 23, 2025, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Kendall C. Reed as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) “to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent” through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum’s Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant, Sesame AI, Inc., is an artificial intelligence company that offers real-time AI voice interactivity. The goal of Complainant’s products is to provide its customers, the computer user, with: “An ever-present brilliant friend and conversationalist, keeping you [the customer] informed and organized, helping you [the customer] be a better version of yourself.”
Complaint’s products became available to the public on February 27, 2025.
Since this date, Complainant has quickly gained traction globally, being recognized for its innovation and technological advancement which also garnered global brand visibility by this continued involvement in the AI community. Complainant’s conversational AI companion has amassed global interest made evident by countless news articles, blogs, and unfortunately, imitation websites claiming to be Sesame AI, such as Respondent.
Complainant holds 13 trademark applications associated with its name in over 9 countries and holds common law rights to the same trademark (SESAME AI) beginning at least as early as February 27, 2025.
By using the Disputed Domain Name, Respondent is seeking to use and benefit from Complainant’s goodwill and global recognition by fraudulently holding itself out as Complainant.
Further, Respondent’s website imitates Complainant’s website in a clear attempt to pass itself off as Complaint, including direct copies of titles, bodies of texts, images, figures and overall layout.
The Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or services mark in which the Complainant has rights.
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its trademark. Further, Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name is not in connection with a bona fides offering of goods or services.
Respondent’s registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name is in bad faith. Respondent is attempting to obtain customer information for nefarious purposes. Further, Respondent’s website functionality, such as the button labeled “Try Sesame AI”, and the “Start Conversation” button link or redirect to or utilize features of Complaint’s actual website and artificial intelligence models, which is an attempt to further confuse visitors to respondent’s website as to the source thereof or to otherwise further wrongfully associate the site with Complaint’s services or website.
B. Respondent
Respondent is an individual/company engaged in the field of artificial intelligence research, commentary, and education, running an independent project exploring practical application of AI in professional settings. The Disputed Domain Name was selected because the word “sesame” is a common English word evoking the concept of “open” or “revealing (as in “Open Sesame”), which is metaphorically aligned with the goals of AI.
Respondent acknowledges that Complainant may have rights in the trademark SESAME. However, the Disputed Domain Name is not confusingly similar to that mark. This is because of the hyphenated term “-ai” and the gTLD “.pro”. As such, an internet user is unlikely to believe that the Disputed Domain Name is an official or affiliated site of Complainant.
Respondent does have rights or legitimate interest in the Disputed Domain Name. Respondent presents on his website commentary and critique about Complainant’s product, which constitutes legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Further, Respondent’s website displays a conspicuous disclaimer of any affiliation with Complaint.
Respondent’s registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name is not in bad faith. Respondent’s intention in registering the Disputed Domain Name was because of its descriptive meaning in the AI context, not to target the Complainant or its trademark. Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name is currently to provide commentary and critique, which is a protected activity. There is no evidence that the Respondent has attempted to sell the Disputed Domain Name to the Complainant, disrupt the Complaint’s business, or intentionally attract user for commercial gain by creating confusion.
Respondent admits that shortly after registration, Respondent made an error in judgement by briefly displaying content sourced from the Complaint’s website as a placeholder during the initial development phase of his website. This was a temporary measure during the initial setup phase and was not indicative of bad faith. Upon reflection, Respondent promptly and permanently removed all such content, and Respondent’s website has since been fundamentally and irrevocably altered so as to present independent comment and criticism of Complainant’s services.
FINDINGS
Complainant began using the putative trademarks SESAME and SESAME AI in commerce on or about February 27, 2025.
Complainant does not have trademarks registration for the putative trademarks SESAME and SESAME AI.
Complainant has not proven that it has common law rights in the putative trademarks SESAME and SESAME.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
In order to satisfy the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), the Complainant must prove it has rights in a trademark. In the present matter, Complainant alleges two trademarks, SESAME and SESAME AI (the “Complainant’s Marks”).
Complainant may prove rights in a trademark by showing a trademark registration from a national trademark authority, such as the United Stated Patent and Trademark Office. See Timec Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Domain Admin, Privacy Protect, LLC (Privacy Protect.org / Gy Ngassa, The solution Engineer Group, D2022-0064 (WIPO Feb. 23, 2022). See WIPO Overview 3.0 (the “Overview”), section 1.2.1., “Where the complainant holds a nationally or regionally registered trademark or service mark, this prima facie satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights for purposes of standing to file a UDRP case.”
On the other hand, A trademark application is not generally seen by panels as being sufficient to prove rights in a trademark. See, Forecast Group, Inc. v. Gregori Martens / BetHub, FA2091062 (Forum May 2, 2024) (“Complainant asserts rights in the POLYBET mark based on a pending United States trademark application (see Serial No. 98464759) that was filed on March 23, 2024, seven days before Complainant submitted its Complaint. However, a pending trademark application does not constitute trademark rights under the Policy.”). See the Overview 3.0, section 1.1.4: “A pending trademark application would not by itself establish trademark rights within the meaning of UDRP paragraph 4(a)(i)”.
In the present matter, Complainant does not present evidence of a trademark registration.
Complaint does present evidence of several trademark applications, but such is unavailing.
Rights in a trademark may also be proven by way of establishing that a putative mark has acquired secondary meaning (also sometimes called “acquired distinctiveness”) through extensive actual use of the trademark in commerce. See Microsoft Corporation v. Story Remix / Inofficial, FA 1734934 (Forum July 10, 2017) (“The Policy does not require a complaint to own a registered trademark…if it can demonstrate established common law right in the mark.”). See Overview section 1.1.1., “The term ‘trademark or service mark’ as used in UDRP paragraph 4(a)(i) encompasses both registered and unregistered (sometimes referred to as common law) marks.”
Relevant evidence of secondary meaning generally concerns market activity in connection with the putative mark, including:
(i) the duration and nature of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys. See Timec Oil, D2022-0064, supra. See the Overview, section 1.3.
As is the norm with respect to matters that must be established under the Policy, proof of secondary meaning cannot be based on mere conclusionary allegations. See Resource Interactive v. IBM Corporation / International Business Machines Corporation, FA 2137992 (Forum Mar. 13, 2025).
The degree or amount of market activity that must be proven in order to demonstrate secondary meaning is significant. See Microsoft Corporation v. Story Remix / Inofficial, FA 1734934 (Forum July 10, 2017) (“Although Complainant does not have any registered trademarks for STORY REMIX, the extensive public press about the STORY REMIX product establishes Complainant’s common law rights in the STORY REMIX trademark.”). See also Iacocca v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assoc., FA 1088017 (Forum Nov. 29, 2007) (“In order to garner the benefit of common law trademark rights, Complaint must lay out, not only evidence of extensive and continuous use of the mark in commerce, but also evince some strong probability that as a result of such exposure, that consumers have come to associate the mark with Complainant, as to the source of the goods.”).
A review of several prior decisions is instructive as to the amount of market activity that has been found to be both sufficient and insufficient.
In Resource Interactive, supra., the complainant asserted common law trademark rights in its putative trademarks “Resource Interactive” and “Resource.” In support of these allegations, the complainant showed that it had been operating since 2021 (then having been approximately four years before the case), and had been using these putative marks in connection therewith, including in connection with a website at resourceinteractive.net, which domain name was registered on June 5, 2021. The Panel found this showing to be insufficient to establish common law trademark rights stating: “The mere incorporation of the company and a printout of the homepage associated with resourceinteractive.net are insufficient to establish common law rights in the marks “Resource Interactive” and “Resource.”
Similarly, in Paladin Labs, Inc. v. Giovanni Cagnoli, PALADIN PHARMA SPA, D2024-1044 (WIPO May 1, 2024), the panel found that the complainant had not produced sufficient evidence that consumers associated the putative mark “Paladin” with the complainant’s goods and services. The Panel stated:
“Here, the screenshots of the Complainant’s website amount to self-generated material which does not serve to show whether consumers associate the alleged mark with the Complainant’s goods and services. The Complainant’s contention that it has been using the mark since 1990 is unsupported by any evidence (albeit that it appears to use the term “Paladin” in press releases dating back to 2013). Although the Complainant’s domain name incorporating said mark has been in existence since 1999, the Complainant produced no evidence showing that it is the original registrant of such domain name and/or how it has been used, and more importantly, recognized by consumers, industry or media over the years.”
In Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati v. matthew Jonas, FA 2060818 (Forum Oct. 3, 2023), the Panel found that the complainant did provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate its putative trademark had acquired secondary meaning. The Panel stated:
“Here, Complainant registered the domain name wsgr.com in 1993, and used it to market and to provide legal services well before the registration of the disputed domain names. Further, Complainant used its WSGR mark in various promotional and advertising materials.”
In Melinda Gates v. Bruce B, FA 1738284 (Forum Aug. 17, 2017) the panel found that common law rights had been proven in the trademark MELINDA GATES by virtue of significant activity by the complainant in the marketplace for over thirteen years, but in Melinda French Gates v. John Clendenon, FA 2003541 (Forum Oct. 3, 2022), the panel found that common law rights had not been proven in in the MELINDA GATES putative trademark by virtue of similar activity in the marketplace over only less than three years.
In the present case, Complainant shows use of the Complainant’s Trademarks in commerce since February 27, 2025, the date on which Complaint began making its products available to the public. Claimant alleges that countless news articles and blogs have covered and discussed Complainant and its products; Complainant provides copies of four such articles as exhibits. Additionally, Respondent points to Respondent’s use of Complainant’s Mark in connection with Respondent’s website as relevant evidence of market recognition.
The Panel finds that this showing is insufficient to establish that Complainant has common law trademark rights in Complainant’s Marks.
The time period over which Complainant has used Complainant’s Mark in commerce is a mere seven months, which is not equal to the years noted in the noted prior decisions and is significantly less than cases that have gone against recognizing common law rights. Although it is possible that the requisite market recognition could have developed in this short period of time, but to establish this, more evidence demonstrating how and why such was the case would have been needed.
Complainant has provided four media articles concerning Complainant and referencing Complainant’s Marks, but it is not readily apparent to the Panel how and why these articles by these sources would have generated the necessary level of public recognition. Again, additional supporting evidence would have been needed.
Complainant’s allegations about other and more extensive media articles and blogs are not supported by evidence.
Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name is at best only very weakly supportive of public recognition as it relates to only one individual and not the broader set of consumers.
As such, Complainant has failed to demonstrate rights in a trademark and has consequently failed to establish the first element of the Policy.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
Because Complainant is required to establish all three elements of the Policy in order to succeed, it is not necessary for the Panel to analyze the second element of the Policy. See Dr. Sheba Roy v. Bullshit Rates, D2025-1960 (WIPO Aug. 6, 2025).
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Because Complainant is required to establish all three elements of the Policy in order to succeed, it is not necessary for the Panel to analyze the third element of the Policy. See Dr. Sheba Roy v. Bullshit Rates, D2025-1960 (WIPO Aug. 6, 2025).
DECISION
Having not established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the sesame-ai.pro domain name REMAIN with Respondent.
Kendall C. Reed Panelist
Dated: October 3, 2025
