EKIN SAS, a French food manufacturer and owner of the EKIN mark and ekin.fr / ekinfrites.fr, filed a UDRP against Ekinfrites.com, claiming the domain was confusingly similar to its brand, passively held, and potentially dangerous for email-based phishing or unfair competition. EKIN argued the Respondent had no authorization to use “ekin” or “ekin frites” in a domain name and was trying to ride on EKIN’s reputation.
The Respondent, investment vehicle FINANCIERE FD controlled by Georges Topal, pushed back hard: it owns the company Ekin Frites, acquired from EKIN via a June 2020 transfer, and holds an exclusive license to use EKIN FRITES as corporate and domain name under an October 2020 agreement. The domain ekinfrites.com matches that corporate name and is used for professional email (MX active, “site under construction” web page), with parallel litigation already pending in French courts over the business transfer and the trademark license.
The Panel found confusing similarity but stopped there, holding that this was not a cybersquatting case at all but a contractual and corporate-name dispute far outside the narrow scope of the UDRP.
Because the validity of the Ekin Frites name and the underlying agreements is already before the French courts, the Panel refused to rule on rights/legitimate interests or bad faith and said the ordinary courts are the proper forum. Making matters worse for EKIN, the Panel noted that the Complainant (represented by counsel) failed to disclose the existing court actions and its close contractual relationship with the Respondent, effectively pretending they were strangers while knowing it could not satisfy the UDRP elements. That non-disclosure and positioning crossed the line into abuse.
Final decision: Complaint denied; ekinfrites.com stays with the Respondent; the Panel issued a Reverse Domain Name Hijacking finding against EKIN SAS.
Copyright © 2025 DomainGang.com · All Rights Reserved.ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER
ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION
EKIN SAS v. Georges TOPAL, FINANCIERE FD
Case No. D2025-3927
1. The Parties
The Complainant is EKIN SAS, France, represented by Fidal, France.
The Respondent is Georges TOPAL, FINANCIERE FD, represented by Hoche Avocats, France.
2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The disputed domain name <ekinfrites.com> is registered with OVH (hereinafter referred to as the “Registrar”).
3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on September 26, 2025. On September 26, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name, as provided by the Complainant. On September 29, 2025, the Registrar transmitted its verification response to the Center, disclosing the registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name. On September 30, 2025, the Center sent an email to the Complainant with the registrant data for the disputed domain name as disclosed by the Registrar, inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint or an amended Complaint. The Complainant did not submit an amended Complaint.
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Rules, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the administrative proceedings commenced on October 7, 2025. In accordance with paragraph 5 of the Rules, the due date for filing a Response was October 31, 2025. The Respondent submitted a Response on October 31, 2025.
On November 11, 2025, the Center appointed Vincent Denoyelle as the sole panelist in this matter. The Administrative Panel finds that it was properly constituted in accordance with the Policy and the Rules. The Administrative Panel has submitted to the Center a Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by paragraph 7 of the Rules.
4. Factual Background
The Complainant is a French company specialized in the manufacture and distribution of food products.
The Complainant is the owner of several EKIN trademarks, including the following:
- French trademark EKIN No. 4016490 filed on July 1, 2013 and registered on March 7, 2014.
The Complainant was also the owner of the following two EKIN FRITES trademarks:
- French trademark EKIN FRITES No. 3184263, which expired on September 19, 2012; and
- French trademark EKIN FRITES No. 889416, which expired on February 9, 2016.
The Complainant has held the domain name <ekin.fr> since April 24, 2006 and <ekinfrites.fr> since May 11, 2020.
The disputed domain name was registered on April 16, 2021 and points to a Registrar parking page with the message “Site en Construction” (“Site under construction”). The MX servers for the disputed domain name are activated for the professional email service of a company owned by the Respondent (the email address being “[…]@ekinfrites.com”).
The Respondent is the holding company of a group of companies engaged in the wholesale trade of food products, including the company Ekin Frites, which was transferred to it by the Complainant by a transfer deed dated June 19, 2020, with a completion date of October 20, 2020. The Complainant also granted an exclusive trademark license in favor of the company Ekin Frites under an agreement dated October 20, 2020, which notably provides that “The Licensor [the Complainant] also grants the Licensee [Ekin Frites] the exclusive right to use the name EKIN FRITES as the domain name for the URL <ekinfrites.fr>, and as the corporate name and/or trade name registered with the Trade and Companies Register for the duration of the exclusivity period and pursuant to the License.”
Furthermore, there are two court proceedings pending in connection with the disputed domain name which is the subject of the Complaint, whereas the Complainant stated in its Complaint that no proceedings existed in relation to the disputed domain name.
5. Parties’ Contentions
A. Complainant
The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the conditions required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.
In particular, the Complainant argues that the disputed domain name is highly similar to the Complainant’s registered trademark rights, to the point of creating a likelihood of confusion with those rights. The Complainant adds that the Respondent has not been authorized, licensed or otherwise permitted by the Complainant to use the term “ekin” or any variation thereof, such as “ekin frites”, in the form of a domain name. The Complainant also stresses that the disputed domain name is being passively held and that the Respondent is deliberately seeking to create confusion with the Complainant’s business.
The Complainant considers that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with the aim of taking advantage of the reputation of the EKIN trademark and the trade name “Ekin” of the Complainant.
The Complainant maintains that, to its knowledge, the Respondent has no legitimate interest in carrying out any activity under the disputed domain name and that, in view of the Complainant’s reputation and the scope of its activities, it is obvious that the Respondent was aware of both the Complainant and its trademarks at the time the disputed domain name was registered. The Complainant states that it fears that email addresses may be associated with the disputed domain name and that the Respondent could take advantage of the Complainant’s reputation to gain the trust of existing or potential customers for the purposes of deception and phishing, or even unfair competition, in particular by presenting itself as the Complainant in order to obtain sensitive information and/or conclude agreements by benefiting from the Complainant’s notoriety. The Complainant ultimately argues that the passive holding of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith use because it is implausible that the disputed domain name could be put to any good-faith use.
B. Respondent
The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not met the conditions required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.
The Respondent considers that the likelihood of confusion between the EKIN trademarks relied upon by the Complainant and the disputed domain name has not been established, relying on principles specific to trademark law.
The Respondent emphasizes that the disputed domain name was registered by the Respondent on behalf of its subsidiary Ekin Frites, since this is precisely its corporate name, and it was contractually agreed between the Complainant and the Respondent that such use could not be contested by anyone, as it does not infringe the rights of third parties and is neither preceded by an earlier trademark nor by any prior use right of another legal entity.
The Respondent has also provided evidence that it uses the disputed domain name, which is identical to the corporate name of one of its companies, for its professional email communications in the context of its commercial activity, and that the Respondent is thus known by the disputed domain name.
As to bad faith, the Respondent points out that the fact that the Respondent was aware of the Complainant at the time of registration of the disputed domain name is self-evident, since the Complainant had transferred the company Ekin Frites to the Respondent a few months before the registration of the disputed domain name.
The Respondent considers that nothing shows that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with the aim of taking advantage of any alleged reputation enjoyed by the Complainant, since the Complainant had no further business activity in the market for the purchase and resale of frozen food products following the transfer of this business to the Respondent on October 20, 2020.
6. Discussion and Findings
A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
It is recognized that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or “threshold”) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 1.7.
The Complainant has demonstrated that it holds trademark rights in goods or services within the meaning of the Policy. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.2.1.
The entirety of the EKIN trademark is reproduced in the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the trademark for the purposes of the Policy. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7.
Although the addition of additional terms – here, “frites” – may be relevant to the second and third elements, the Panel finds that the addition of this term does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the trademark under the Policy. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.8.
The Panel therefore finds that the first element of the Policy has been satisfied.
B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy lists circumstances in which a respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.
Although the burden of proof in UDRP proceedings lies in principle with the complainant, panels have recognized that it would be difficult for a complainant to prove that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name, as this would require “proving a negative”, and involves information that is often primarily within the respondent’s knowledge or control. Thus, once a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name (although the overall burden of proof remains with the complainant). If the respondent does not provide such evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element of the Policy. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.1.
The Panel notes that the disputed domain name is identical to the corporate name of a company owned by the Respondent, in which it holds rights that it acquired from the Complainant following a transfer in favor of the Respondent.
It therefore appears that the company owned by the Respondent is known by the disputed domain name, and that its corporate name predates the disputed domain name.
However, the Panel notes that the Respondent brought proceedings in October 2025 against the Complainant before the Commercial Court of Bobigny regarding the transfer agreement between the company Ekin Frites, the Complainant and the Respondent. In addition, the Complainant brought proceedings against the company Ekin Frites before the Judicial Court of Paris in July 2025, seeking termination of the license agreement between the Complainant and the company Ekin Frites.
In view of these elements, given that the validity of the Respondent’s corporate name is the subject of proceedings before the ordinary courts, the Panel is of the opinion that it is not for it to rule on this legal issue, which is decisive for the assessment of the Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name.
In any event, the Panel is of the view that the dispute between the parties clearly goes beyond the question of whether the registration and use of the disputed domain name is abusive with regard to the Complainant’s trademark, and instead requires a determination on the validity of the transfer agreement and of the corporate name of Ekin Frites.
This case does not constitute an instance of “cybersquatting” and does not fall within the limited scope of the Policy (see, in this respect, Jetfly Aviation S.A. v. Paol S.A., WIPO Case No. D2011-1576; Société d’Economie Mixte d’Aménagement et de Gestion du Marché d’Intérêt National de la Région Parisienne v. Monsieur Romain Tournier, WIPO Case No. D2016-2084; Agence Immobilière l’Occitane v. Serge Bastiani, SAS Agence Immobilière Occitane, WIPO Case No. D2021-1042; Madame Françoise Veillard v. Laure Beaudou, Le Campus canin, WIPO Case No. D2023-2644).
Accordingly, the Panel is of the opinion that the appropriate forum to resolve the dispute between the parties is the ordinary courts, so as to allow a comprehensive assessment of the entire dispute.
Thus, the Panel considers that it is appropriate to deny the Complaint.
C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
In light of the above, it is not necessary to carry out an analysis with respect to the third element of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.
D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (RDNH)
Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at domain name hijacking or primarily to harass the domain name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. The mere fact that a complaint is dismissed is not in itself sufficient to constitute an abuse of process. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 4.16.1.
Abusive proceedings are addressed in paragraph 15(e) of the Rules, which states: “If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, or was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.”
The following circumstances listed in section 4.16 of WIPO Overview 3.0 may support a finding of abuse of the administrative proceeding: “(i) facts showing that the complainant knew it could not succeed on any of the three elements; (…) (viii) filing a complaint based on only the barest of allegations without any supporting evidence.”
Furthermore, where a complainant is represented by counsel, some panels have held that the complainant should be held to a higher standard, in view of the certifications made under paragraphs 3(b)(xiii) and (xiv) of the Rules.
The Panel notes that the Complainant, represented by counsel, stated that there were no pending proceedings in relation to the disputed domain name, whereas the Complainant could not have been unaware that such proceedings existed. The Panel also notes that the Complainant completely omitted in its Complaint any reference to the circumstances of its close relationship with the Respondent, as though the Complainant did not know the Respondent, even though the Complainant knows the Respondent very well and had transferred to it a company whose corporate name is identical to the disputed domain name. The Complainant could not have been unaware that it could not succeed on the three required elements, because there are fundamental factors that clearly indicated that the Complaint would be denied.
7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied. In addition, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.
/Vincent Denoyelle/
Vincent Denoyelle
Sole Panelist
Date: November 25, 2025
