Domain hacks connect the two parts to the left and right of the dot, forming a single word (or phrase.)
The case involving the domain Car.cash utilizes the car keyword, seemingly generic on its own, which creates a new entity, CAR CASH, matching a trademark registered by Sonic Divisional Operations LLC.
The company filed a UDRP to get the domain, which was granted. The Respondent’s use of the domain was to pass off as an associate or affiliate of the Complainant’s business at CarCash.com, aiming to create confusion. The domain was also listed for sale with a price tag of $5,000 dollars.
Respondent’s site does, however, represent that the site is sponsored by “CAR.CASH” and does not contain any statement or disclaimer advising the visitor that the site is not Complainant’s. Respondent’s website advertises vehicle purchase and sale services, which are also offered by Complainant on its website and on its mobile app as shown on Complaint Exhibit D. By using the confusingly similar domain name, the site sponsor name that is essentially identical to Complaint’s mark, and offering the same services as Complainant, Respondent is passing off as Complainant or an authorized affiliate, purporting to offer the same services offered by and thus competing with Complainant.
Final decision: Transfer the domain Car.cash to the Complainant.
Copyright © 2025 DomainGang.com · All Rights Reserved.Sonic Divisional Operations, LLC v. Chad Buchanan / Domain Brokers Group LLC
Claim Number: FA2504002149314
PARTIES
Complainant is Sonic Divisional Operations, LLC (“Complainant”), represented by William B. Cannon of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, North Carolina, USA. Respondent is Chad Buchanan / Domain Brokers Group LLC (“Respondent”), California, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is car.cash, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on April 8, 2025; Forum received payment on April 8, 2025.
On April 8, 2025, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the car.cash domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On April 9, 2025, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of April 29, 2025 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@car.cash. Also on April 9, 2025, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no formal Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On April 30, 2025, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) “to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent” through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum’s Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a formal Response from Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Complainant provides a downloadable application for buying, selling and appraising vehicles. It has rights in the CARCASH mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Respondent’s car.cash domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the CARCASH mark as it incorporates the entire mark, merely changing the second element of the mark, “cash,” to a generic top-level domain (gTLD), which increases the confusing similarity.
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. It is not affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, it is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to pass off as and compete with Complainant, and Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name.
Respondent registered and uses the domain name in bad faith. It attempts to attract for commercial gain Internet users to its website by creating confusion with Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website, it registered the domain name primarily to disrupt Complainant’s business, and it registered the domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
FINDINGS
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent’s failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant’s undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0 is not a definitive statement of applicable law which governs any particular issue, but it does express a consensus among a significant number of UDRP panelists as to how particular issues typically are and should be resolved. This Panel accepts that consensus on this and other issues addressed later in this Decision.
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Identical and/or Confusingly Similar
The CARCASH mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 5,897,166) on October 29, 2019 (TSDR printout included in Complaint Exhibit B). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (stating, “Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”).
Respondent’s car.cash domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the CARCASH mark. It consists exclusively of the mark itself except for the dot inserted between the two words comprising the mark. This essentially converts the second element of the mark into a TLD. Although the addition of a TLD is frequently considered irrelevant to the confusing similarity determination, that does not hold true when the TLD consists of or contains all or part of a protected mark. DD IP Holder LLC v. Phill Aspden, FA 1603215 (Forum April 8, 2015) (finding the domain name dunkin.coffee identical to the mark DUNKIN COFFEE), DOMINO’S IP HOLDER LLC v. CJ Sculti, FA 1629479 (Forum August 24, 2015) (insertion of a period did not sufficiently distinguish DOMINOS.PIZZA from complainant’s registered trademark DOMINOS PIZZA). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the domain name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the CARCASH mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name because (i) it is not affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, (ii) it is not using the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead is using it to pass off as and compete with Complainant, and (iii) Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant states that Respondent has no affiliation with it and that it has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make these allegations and they are not disputed. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the emitmortgage.com domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register Domain Name featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (“Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibit H contains screenshots of pages of the website resolving from the domain name. Respondent’s website does not copy or mimic the style or general appearance of Complainant’s website as shown on Complaint Exhibits F and G, and in fact the parties’ websites are much different in that respect. Respondent’s site does, however, represent that the site is sponsored by “CAR.CASH” and does not contain any statement or disclaimer advising the visitor that the site is not Complainant’s. Respondent’s website advertises vehicle purchase and sale services, which are also offered by Complainant on its website and on its mobile app as shown on Complaint Exhibit D. By using the confusingly similar domain name, the site sponsor name that is essentially identical to Complaint’s mark, and offering the same services as Complainant, Respondent is passing off as Complainant or an authorized affiliate, purporting to offer the same services offered by and thus competing with Complainant. This does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) (“The usage of Complainant’s NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name.”), Ripple Labs Inc. v. NGYEN NGOC PHUONG THAO, FA 1741737 (Forum Aug. 21, 2017) (“Respondent uses the [disputed] domain name to divert Internet users to Respondent’s website… confusing them into believing that some sort of affiliation exists between it and Complainant… [which] is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).
Respondent’s use of the domain name at a minimum creates initial interest confusion, which negates any pretense of a bona fide offering of goods or services. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. DAVID DELMAN / DAVID DELMAN, FA 1579437 (Forum Oct. 27, 2014) (“Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name creates a form of initial interest confusion, attracting users to the domain name.… The Panel is persuaded on this point, and it finds additional evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).
The WHOIS information provided to Forum by the registrar lists the named Respondent as the registrant of the domain name. Neither of these names bears any resemblance to the domain name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the Domain Name or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the domain name.
On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name.
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent ‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, by passing off as Complainant and advertising the same services offered by Complainant, Respondent is using the confusingly similar domain name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. The evidence does not disclose whether Respondent is actually selling the services advertised on its website or fraudulently representing that it does and luring unsuspecting consumers into bogus financial transactions. Regardless of which scenario is present here, Respondent’s conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”).
As discussed above, Respondent is using the domain name to pass off as Complainant. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum December 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where “Respondent registered and uses the lbittrex.com domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant’s own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.”).
Next, it is apparent that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name in December 2024 (WHOIS printout submitted as Complaint Exhibit A shows creation date). Complainant began using its mark at least as early as the first use date of April 2019 shown on the TSDR printout in included in Complaint Exhibit B. Although Complainant submitted no evidence of the extent of notoriety or public recognition of the CARCASH mark as a source indicator for Complainant, the mark itself is unique, a coined term which would not normally be chosen by a person for a domain name except to target this Complainant. It is more likely than not that Respondent knew of Complainant and its mark when it registered the domain name. Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), acquiring a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm’cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent’s contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant’s rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s conduct also falls within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) reads as follows: “you [the respondent] have registered the domain name primarily for the purposes of disrupting the business of a competitor” (emphasis supplied). By using the domain name to divert internet traffic intended for Complainant to its own site, Respondent is clearly disrupting the business of Complainant. And, by purportedly offering the same services as those offered by Complainant, Respondent is also competing with Complainant.
There is, however, another aspect of the concept of competition to be considered. In order for a respondent’s conduct to fall within Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), the competition must exist before the domain name is registered. Otherwise, the respondent’s conduct would not fall within the language of ¶ 4(b)(iii), paraphrased as “you registered the domain name primarily to disrupt the business of a competitor.” The competition must exist before the registration. In this case there is no evidence that Respondent was competing with Complainant prior to its registration of the domain name, and it appears that any actual competition between them arose only after Respondent registered and began using it. Even then, it is questionable whether disrupting the Complainant’s business was Respondent’s primary purpose in registering the domain name. On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that Respondent’s primary motive was not so much to harass or annoy an existing commercial adversary as it was to trade upon Complainant’s goodwill and reputation and profit commercially by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its site, which is properly addressed under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent’s conduct does not fall within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
That said, using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a web site which passes off as and disrupts the business of a complainant is still bad faith. As discussed above, the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant by passing off as and competing with that complainant is sufficient evidence of bad faith to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). The disruptive impact its conduct would have upon Complainant’s business is obvious and would surely have been known to Respondent. Respondent intentionally went forward with its plans in spite of that, and this demonstrates bad faith independently of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Red Wing Shoe Company, Inc. v. wei zhang / Magdalena Jennifer / Mu Yan / Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA1911001873163 (Forum January 3, 2020).
For the reasons above set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the domain name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
DECISION
Complainant having established all three elements required under the Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the car.cash domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
May 1, 2025
