Florida realtor Mitchell Kesller Holguin Fortunato, owner of US trademark ORLANDO LIVING (reg. 2020, “orlando” disclaimed) for real estate services, went after the domain OrlandoLiving.com, used by fellow Orlando agent Roberto “Bobby” Baldor for his “the baldor group” site and email since buying the domain in August 2022 for $9,995 dollars. The Complainant argued the domain is identical to his mark, used in the same city and market to mislead consumers and divert clients, and that continued use after two cease-and-desist letters showed bad faith.
Baldor, represented by Nardella & Nardella, attacked the mark as highly descriptive, pointed to widespread use of “orlando living,” and submitted production data showing he’d closed far more deals than the complainant, claiming he’d never heard of him or seen the mark when he acquired the name and that his use is as a descriptive URL, not as a brand.
Panelist David Bernstein held that the federal registration gives the complainant standing and that orlandoliving.com is identical to the mark, but found no evidence that Baldor knew or should have known of the complainant when he registered the domain and declined to treat post–cease and desist use, under counsel’s advice, as bad faith. With bad faith registration and use not proven, the complaint failed, and the panel also refused the respondent’s request for reverse domain name hijacking, finding the filing not frivolous given the identical mark/domain and local competition.
Final decision: Complaint denied; orlandoliving.com remains with the Respondent.
Copyright © 2025 DomainGang.com · All Rights Reserved.ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER – ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION
Mitchell Kesller Holguin Fortunato v. Roberto (“Bobby”) Baldor Case No. D2025-40901. The Parties
The Complainant is Mitchell Kesller Holguin Fortunato, United States of America (“United States”), self-represented.
The Respondent is Roberto (“Bobby”) Baldor, United States, represented by Nardella & Nardella, PLLC, United States.
2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The disputed domain name orlandoliving.com is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC (the “Registrar”).
3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on October 7, 2025. On October 7, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On October 20, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details.
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on October 21, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was November 14, 2025. The Response was filed with the Center on November 14, 2025.
The Center appointed David H. Bernstein as the sole panelist in this matter on November 20, 2025. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
4. Factual Background
The Complainant is Mitchell Kesller Holguin Fortunato, an individual United States citizen. The Complainant is the owner of United States Trademark Registration No. 6,004,235 for ORLANDO LIVING for “Real estate agency services; providing information in the field of real estate,” filed on July 12, 2019, and registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on March 3, 2020. In the registration, the Complainant disclaimed any exclusive right to use the word “orlando” apart from the mark as shown. The Complainant claims continuous use of the ORLANDO LIVING mark since August 1, 2019.
The Respondent, Roberto (“Bobby”) Baldor, is an individual United States citizen who acquired the disputed domain name on August 2, 2022, for USD 9,995. The Respondent thereafter began using the disputed domain name for a website promoting his real estate services located in Orlando, Florida, which he operates under his THE BALDOR GROUP brand.
The Complainant, through his former counsel, sent two cease-and-desist letters, dated May 16, 2025, and June 27, 2025, to the Respondent. The Respondent’s counsel replied on June 4, 2025, by saying that the Respondent strongly disagreed with the Complainant’s contentions and denied that there was any trademark infringement. Unsatisfied with the response, the Complainant notified the Respondent’s counsel that he filed his Complaint with the Center.
5. Parties’ Contentions
A. Complainant
The Complainant contends that he has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.
First, the Complainant alleges that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant’s ORLANDO LIVING trademark. Specifically, the Complainant contends that the disputed domain name incorporates the entirety of the Complainant’s trademark without alteration. The Complainant further contends that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name in the same geographic market—Orlando, Florida—as the Complainant. The Complainant further contends that the Respondent is in direct competition with the Complainant, as they both provide real estate services. The Complainant contends that the Respondent’s use of the trademark falsely suggests that the Respondent’s services are associated with, endorsed by, or affiliated with the Complainant.
Second, the Complainant alleges that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Complainant asserts that the Respondent is not authorized, licensed, or otherwise permitted by the Complainant to use the ORLANDO LIVING mark. The Complainant asserts that the Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed domain name more than a year after the Complainant registered his trademark was a strategic move by the Respondent to exploit the goodwill of the Complainant’s established brand. The Complainant further contends that the Respondent has made no legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name. Rather, according to the Complainant, the Respondent has used the disputed domain name solely to misappropriate the Complainant’s brand and divert consumers seeking the Complainant’s services to the Respondent’s competing real estate business.
Finally, the Complainant alleges that the Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name is in bad faith. The Complainant contends that, because the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name more than a year after the Complainant registered his trademark, the Complainant’s rights were already well-established and publicly known. The Complainant asserts that the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name in the same geographic area and market was a deliberate action to confuse consumers and divert them away from the Complainant’s business. The Complainant additionally contends that the Respondent’s continued use of the disputed domain name even after receiving two formal cease-and-desist letters demonstrates that the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name has been in bad faith.
B. Respondent
The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied any of the three of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name, let alone all of them.
The Respondent first argues that the Complainant lacks trademark rights because the mark is subject to challenge under 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Specifically, the Respondent asserts that the Complainant’s trademark is invalid because it combines a geographically descriptive term that is not subject to exclusive trademark protection (“orlando”) with a term that is too descriptive or generic to function as a source identifier (“living”). According to the Respondent, the term “living” is ubiquitous and consumers are likely to perceive it as conveying content or characteristics rather than a mark. The Respondent further contends that the phrase “orlando living” is widely used across the marketplace. According to the Respondent, this broad, uncontrolled third-party usage demonstrates that the phrase is generic or highly descriptive in the relevant context, and therefore, consumers are accustomed to encountering it from numerous, unrelated providers.
The Respondent further argues that the Complainant is forum shopping to avoid litigating the substance of his trademark infringement claim in United States federal court. The Respondent notes that the Complainant’s second cease-and-desist letter threatened to file a complaint in federal court under the Lanham Act. According to the Respondent, the Complainant’s choice to resolve the issue under the UDRP signals that the Complainant would not succeed in an action in federal court and casts doubt on the validity and enforceability of the Complainant’s trademark.
The Respondent further argues that the Complainant has not used the mark in connection with bona fide real estate services. The Respondent argues that there is no evidence that the Complainant has used ORLANDO LIVING in association with actual real estate brokerage or sales activities. The Respondent further argues that the mark does not appear on the Complainant’s business website, sales history, social media marketing, or real estate publications. According to the Respondent, the Complainant’s only use of the mark is in the Complainant’s Instagram handle, which was changed after the Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed domain name. Thus, the Respondent contends, the prolonged absence of use establishes abandonment of the Complainant’s ORLANDO LIVING mark.
The Respondent argues that he has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Respondent points to his lawful purchase of the disputed domain name three years ago, and his public, consistent, and extensive use of the disputed domain name since that purchase. The Respondent contends that: (1) he has invested substantially in branding, advertising, and development tied directly to the disputed domain name; (2) he has operated in good faith, with no knowledge of infringement, and with a long-established professional record as one of the top real estate agents in Orlando ; (3) he has developed substantial common law rights through commercial use, marketing prominence, and marketplace recognition under the disputed domain name; (4) he has an office and a team that all work under public profiles associated with the disputed domain name; (5) he has used the disputed domain name in well-known, public, and permanent marketing efforts; and (6) he does not advertise, market, or otherwise promote goods or services under the name ORLANDO LIVING, rather ORLANDO LIVING is used solely as a website and for associated email addresses.
The Respondent also contends that the Complainant has failed to demonstrate that the disputed domain name has been registered and used in bad faith. The Respondent asserts that he had no knowledge of the Complainant, or the Complainant’s trademark, prior to the initiation of this matter. The Respondent further contends that the Complainant was not in any meaningful way in the real estate market given that the Complainant has reportedly sold only approximately ten properties over the past five years. The Respondent asserts that he had no reason to know of the Complainant or the Complainant’s business activities. The Respondent further contends that his lack of knowledge or interaction with the Complainant serves as evidence that he did not procure the disputed domain name in an attempt to deny it to the Complainant or for the purpose of disrupting the Complainant’s business. Rather, the Respondent asserts that the Complainant wants to take the Respondent’s domain name to divert online traffic and prospective clientele from the Respondent’s successful real estate business.
6. Discussion and Findings
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain an order that a disputed domain name be transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights;
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
For the reasons stated below, the Panel finds that the Complainant has not proven all three elements by a preponderance of the evidence.
A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
The first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition, (“WIPO Overview 3.0”), section 1.7. The Complainant must show both that it owns rights in a trademark, as well as that the trademark is identical or confusingly similar to the disputed domain name. The test for confusing similarity encompasses a comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7.
The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. “Where the complainant holds a nationally or regionally registered trademark or service mark, this prima facie satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights for purposes of standing to file a UDRP case.” WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.2.1.
The Respondent nevertheless argues that the Complainant lacks trademark rights. But the Respondent has not sought to cancel the Complainant’s trademark registration. Nor has the Respondent made a compelling showing that the existing registration should be cancelled. Electronic Commerce Media, Inc. v. Taos Mountain, Claim Number: FA0008000095344 (Forum Oct. 10, 2000) (given that a federal trademark registration has a presumption of validity, a UDRP panel should not disregard such a registration absent compelling evidence of invalidity). The Respondent is correct that ORLANDO is a geographically descriptive term, and that LIVING is a widely-used dictionary term, but that does not make the combination ORLANDO LIVING inherently unprotectible as a trademark. Indeed, the USPTO has determined that the mark as a whole is inherently distinctive and has registered the mark without requiring a showing of acquired distinctiveness. In addition, although the Respondent argues that the Complainant is not using his mark in commerce, the Complainant did submit specimens of use to the USPTO (including a brochure, a business card, an Instagram page and a website), and the USPTO accepted those specimens as proof of the mark’s use in commerce.
In sum, the Respondent simply has not come forward with compelling evidence that the Complainant’s registered ORLANDO LIVING mark is generic, or fails to function as a trademark, or has been abandoned, or is otherwise invalid. Accordingly, the Complainant’s trademark registration for ORLANDO LIVING is sufficient to establish that the Complainant owns trademark rights in the mark.
Turning to the second part of the first element, the entirety of the ORLANDO LIVING mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 1.7.
The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.
B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Under section 4(c) of the Policy, a respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a domain name by asserting that, before any notice of the dispute, the respondent used or made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 2.1.
A key question here is whether the Respondent’s use is “bona fide.” To be bona fide, the offering of goods or services must not infringe upon the Complainant’s trademark in ORLANDO LIVING. See e.g., On Ag, On Clouds GmbH v. Nguyen Luu, Vuong Hoang, AN NGUYEN, NEO CORP, and Ngoc Tam Nguyen, WIPO Case No. D2021-1714 (“a use cannot be deemed bona fide if the disputed domain names constitute trademark infringement”). Even if any such infringement is unintentional, a use is not “bona fide” under the Policy if it is infringing (though issues of intent and knowledge, with respect to paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy, may be highly relevant as part of the consideration of the third element of the UDRP). On the facts of this case, the Complainant has a credible argument that the Respondent’s use is not “bona fide” given that the Respondent’s domain utilizes exactly the Complainant’s trademark, and the Respondent offers the same services in the same geographic area as the Complainant.
Ultimately, the question of whether the Respondent’s use is infringing raises difficult and close factual questions. Among the issues to be determined are the similarity of the parties’ marks as actually used in commerce (and whether differences in logos and presentations helps reduce the risk of confusion), how similar the parties’ services are (for example, do they operate in the same segment of the real estate market?), how crowded the field is with other similar marks, how much overlap there is in the parties’ marketing channels, how similar and sophisticated are the parties’ consumers, whether there has been any evidence of actual confusion in the three years of coexistence, and whether the Respondent adopted the mark with the bad faith intent to cause confusion (as discussed below, the Panel finds, on the record submitted, that is not the case here). All of these factors are designed to help inform the ultimate question of whether the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name is likely to cause confusion with the Complainant’s mark, which is a prerequisite for a claim of infringement. In addition, the Respondent asserts that he is not using the disputed domain name as a trademark, but rather, only as a URL for his website.
This raises the question of whether his use might be a descriptive fair use under Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, which would be an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement – an issue that neither party briefed. If it were necessary to the adjudication of this dispute for the Panel to decide those issues, it would likely want the parties to file supplemental submissions to address these infringement and fair use issues, but since that would not change the outcome of this case given the Panel’s determination as to the Respondent’s bad faith, below, that would not be an efficient use of the Parties’ or Panel’s time and resources. For these reasons, and because the UDRP is intended to be a quick and efficient dispute resolution process, the Panel declines to reach this issue.C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
The evidence in the case file as presented does not support a finding that the Respondent’s aim in acquiring the disputed domain name was to profit from or exploit the Complainant’s trademark.
In alleging that the disputed domain was registered and used in bad faith, the Complainant makes three arguments: (1) that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name more than a year after the Complainant registered the ORLANDO LIVING mark; (2) that the Respondent works in direct competition with Complainant in the Orlando real estate market; and (3) that the Respondent continued to use the disputed domain name after the Complainant sent two cease-and-desist letters.
The first two of these arguments are predicated on the assertion that the Respondent engaged in certain actions with knowledge of the Complainant’s trademark rights. The problem with these two arguments is that the Complainant has not submitted evidence that establishes or supports an inference that the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant’s mark when it acquired the disputed domain name in 2022. WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.2.2; see also uwe GMbH v. Telepathy, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2007-0261
(finding bad faith had not been established where the Complainant put forth no evidence to suggest the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant’s mark at the time it acquired the disputed domain name); PC Mall, Inc. v. NWPCMALL LLC, WIPO Case No. D2007-0420 (declining to find bad faith where there were no facts in the record to support that the Respondent selected the disputed domain name with knowledge of the Complainant’s marks intentionally). The Complainant has not, for example, submitted evidence that his mark was well known at the time of the acquisition by the Respondent, such that the Respondent should have been aware of it. Further, the Complainant has not submitted evidence of his sales and advertising at the time that would have alerted the Respondent to the Complainant’s registration of the mark. The only evidence submitted by the Complainant in support of this claim is a single “client testimony” from an individual seemingly connected to the Complainant, dated October 2025, which the Panel finds insufficient to establish that the Respondent was, more likely than not, aware of the Complainant and his activities under the mark when he acquired the disputed domain name.
For his part, the Respondent has submitted a declaration in which he has sworn that he “had no knowledge of, contact with, or dealings of any kind with the Complainant, Mitchell K.H. Fortunato.” The Respondent also swore in the declaration that, “[t]o this day, I have never seen Mr. Fortunato—or anyone else—using the term “Orlando Living” in commerce.” In addition to this declaration, the Respondent also submitted an “Agent Production Detail Report” for himself and the Complainant that detailed the number of sales for both the Respondent and the Complainant from 2020 to 2025. During that period, the Complainant listed and/or sold 16 units, and the Respondent listed and/or sold 265.50 units. Weighing all of this evidence, the Panel finds the Respondent’s assertion that he never had heard of the Complainant or his mark at the time he acquired the disputed domain name to be credible (at least on the evidence submitted).
The Complainant’s third argument in favor of a finding of bad faith registration and use is that the Respondent continued to use the disputed domain name after receipt of the Complainant’s two cease-and-desist letters. First, the Respondent’s continued use provides no evidence of bad faith registration, which is a necessary element of the Complainant’s case. Nor, on this record, is it evidence of bad faith use. Contrary to the Complainant’s argument, the Respondent’s continued use is not bad faith if the Respondent had the reasonable subjective belief that he was entitled to use the disputed domain name. Indeed, the Respondent submitted evidence that his lawyer communicated that he “strongly disagree[d] with the contentions of the letter[s]” to the Complainant. Under the circumstances, the Respondent’s continued use of the disputed domain name does not evidence bad faith use.
This is not a case where the Respondent’s only plausible motive in choosing the disputed domain name was to trade on the goodwill of the Complainant’s mark. Cf., e.g., Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, Maison Fondee en 1772 v. The Polygenix Group Co., WIPO Case No. D2000-0163 (veuveclicquot.org was “so obviously connected with such a well-known product that its very use by someone with no connection with the product suggests opportunistic bad faith”). Rather, this appears to be a case in which two parties, both offering real estate services in Orlando, Florida, selected identical signs because of their communicative elements. It is true that the Complainant has priority from a trademark law perspective, and it is possible that the Complainant would be able to prove trademark infringement, but the Complainant has not shown that the Respondent knew about the Complainant or the Complainant’s mark and targeted that mark in his registration of the disputed domain name.
The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established.
D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking
Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if after considering the submissions, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. The mere lack of success of the Complaint is not, on its own, sufficient to constitute Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. WIPO Overview 3.0, section
4.16. To establish Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, there must be evidence of knowledge on the part of the complainant of the respondent’s right or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name and evidence ofharassment or similar conduct by the complainant in the face of such knowledge. Sydney Opera House Trust v. Trilynx Pty. Limited, WIPO Case No. D2000-1224.
The Respondent urges the Panel to find that the Complainant engaged in Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Respondent contends that the Complainant’s years of non-use of the mark, followed by his asserted claim to the disputed domain name once the Respondent’s brand had matured, demonstrate the Complainant’s bad faith.
The Panel is not persuaded that the circumstances of this case justify a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Complainant has a federal registration for the ORLANDO LIVING mark, which is identically reproduced in the disputed domain name. There is no question that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar for purposes of the Policy and that the Respondent was operating in the same industry in the same geographic area. The Complainant has also made arguments that the Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name constitutes trademark infringement (an issue, as noted above, that raises close issues), which arguments are not facially frivolous.
Although the Panel has found that the Complainant has failed to establish that the Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith, the Complainant’s case was most assuredly not so weak as to render the filing of the Complaint an act of bad faith.
Furthermore, a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking is an equitable remedy that only should be granted to a Respondent who himself has acted in good faith. Premium Blend, Inc. v. Michael Eymer, WIPI Case No. D2025-3012. Here, the Respondent has made some overly aggressive assertions in his Response, such as his unsupported attack on the Complainant’s federal trademark registration and his unproven claim that the Complainant has not used his trademark in commerce. These arguments tarnish the Respondent’s position as a fully good-faith actor in this proceeding.
The Panel therefore concludes that the Complainant has not engaged in Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.
7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.
/David H. Bernstein/ David H. Bernstein Sole Panelist
Date: December 4, 2025
