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JSwipe.com : Jewish dating app maker wins #domain in UDRP

Dating app maker Smooch Labs filed a UDRP to get the domain JSwipe.com from its registrant.

According to the UDRP, the Complainant launched the JSwipe dating platform in the US in April 2014.

The JSwipe app has grown rapidly amongst the global, millennial Jewish community, operating from the domain JSwipeApp.com that was registered in January 2014.

Meanwhile, JSwipe.com was registered in September 2013, and is being offered for sale via Afternic, with a minimum asking price of $5,000 dollars. The domain is pointed at Tinder, another popular dating app.

The sole panelist at the National Arbitration Forum, did not indicate that the domain’s registration date is older than the mark’s common law claims other than in the footnote, alleging that the current registrant is not the original one. The Respondent did not respond.

Final decision: transfer the domain JSwipe.com to the Complainant.

Smooch Labs Inc. v. Steven Nerayoff

Claim Number: FA2104001940627

PARTIES

Complainant is Smooch Labs Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Fabricio Vayra of Perkins Coie LLP, District of Columbia, USA. Respondent is Steven Nerayoff (“Respondent”), New York, USA.

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <jswipe.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on April 7, 2021; the Forum received payment on April 7, 2021.

 

On April 7, 2021, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <jswipe.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

On April 12, 2021, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of May 3, 2021 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@jswipe.com. Also on April 12, 2021, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

On May 7, 2021, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) “to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent” through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum’s Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant launched the JSwipe dating platform in the United States in April 2014. Since its inception, the JSwipe platform has grown rapidly amongst the global, millennial Jewish community. Complainant has established common law rights in the JSWIPE mark through its use of that mark in commerce. The mark has become associated exclusively with Complainant in the minds of the public. Further, Complainant has applied for registration of the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <jswipe.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s JSWIPE mark as it incorporates the Complainant’s JSWIPE mark in its entirety, simply adding the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com”.

 

Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Complainant has not authorized him to use its mark, and Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name. Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as he uses it to redirect Internet traffic to the web site of a competitor of Complainant for commercial gain.

 

Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He attempts for commercial gain to attract Internet users to his web site by causing confusion as to the source, sponsorship, endorsement or affiliation of his web site and is using the Domain Name to disrupt Complainant’s business. Additionally, Respondent registered the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the JSWIPE mark.

B. Respondent

Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.

FINDINGS

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring as domain name:

(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

In view of Respondent’s failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant’s undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).

The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

Complainant has not registered its JSWIPE mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) does not require a complainant to own a registered mark if it can demonstrate common law rights in the mark. Microsoft Corporation v. Story Remix / Inofficial, FA 1734934 (Forum July 10, 2017) (finding that “The Policy does not require a complainant to own a registered trademark prior to a respondent’s registration if it can demonstrate established common law rights in the mark.”). To establish common law rights in a mark, a complainant must prove that the mark has acquired a secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will….”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0 ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”

Complaint Exhibit D is a screenshot of Complainant’s web site at <jswipeapp.com> in January 2021, which demonstrates its use of the JSWIPE mark at that time. Complaint Exhibit E includes an online article published by Spark Networks describing its acquisition of Complainant in October 2015 and another article published by the New York Times in March 2015 describing the JSWIPE dating app and its rapid rise in popularity with millennial Jewish people (250,000 users in 70 countries).

Complaint Exhibit F consists of TESS reports published by the USPTO evidencing the August 2014 applications filed by Complainant for registration of its JSWIPE mark. It is well-settled that an application for registration of a mark with the USPTO is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Imagine Nation Books Ltd. v LEE, LAWRENCE, FA 1662128 (Forum Mar. 31, 2016) (“Complainant’s only assertion of rights in the mark stem from a trademark application and the statement that Complainant offers ‘services and goods under the name Collective Goods’… [and] pending trademark applications do not establish rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). Nevertheless, Complainant’s applications lend weight to the existence of secondary meaning for the mark and tend to corroborate the facts described in the articles described above. On the foregoing evidence the Panel has no trouble finding that Complainant has demonstrated its rights in the JSWIPE mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

Respondent’s <jswipe.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s JSWIPE mark as it includes the mark in its entirety, merely adding the gTLD “.com”. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Oki Data Ams., Inc. v. ASD, Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2001) (“[T]he fact that a domain name wholly incorporates a Complainant’s registered mark is sufficient to establish identity [sic] or confusing similarity for purposes of the Policy despite the addition of other words to such marks.”), Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis). The WIPO Overview 3.0 ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the JSWIPE mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.

Rights or Legitimate Interests

If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.

Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):

 

(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;

(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark, (ii) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because it automatically redirects Internet traffic to the web site of a competitor of Complainant. These allegations are addressed as follows:

Complainant states that it has not licensed or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).

The WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit A lists “Steven Narayoff” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).

Complaint Exhibit A includes a printout of a report at <redirect-checker.org> demonstrating that the Domain Name automatically redirects Internet traffic to the web site of <Tinder.com>, which is another online dating service. By its very nature, <Tinder.com> competes directly with Complainant, even though it is not directed specifically at Jewish customers. Using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect internet users to a site that competes with a complainant is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Invesco Ltd. v. Premanshu Rana, FA 1733167 (Forum July 10, 2017) (“Use of a domain name to divert Internet users to a competing website is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”).

The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:

(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.

The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Although Respondent’s site is not a typical pay-per-click site offering a number of links, it appears that Respondent here obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Name in much the same way as the sponsors of those sites. The only difference is that his web site redirects traffic to a single web site operated by Complainant’s competitor. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to pay-per-click sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). It appears from Complainant’s undisputed allegations that Respondent here gains some form of remuneration from the competitor to whose site Respondent redirects traffic. Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the competitor benefits from the traffic forwarded from Respondent’s site. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO,2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).

Complainant alleges that Respondent’s conduct also falls within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). By using the Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to a web site which automatically redirects traffic to the web site of a competitor, Respondent is clearly disrupting the business of Complainant. There is no evidence, however, that Respondent is actually a competitor of Complainant. A number of UDRP panels have found that using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant was bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), even when the respondent was not a competitor. Others have essentially by-passed the competition factor, focusing instead on disruption, and have simply found bad faith under ¶ 4(b)(iii), without further discussion or analysis.[i]

Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) reads as follows: “you [the respondent] have registered the domain name primarily for the purposes of disrupting the business of a competitor” (emphasis supplied). The concept of “competition” in the context of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) has been subject to various interpretations by UDRP panels. Some have interpreted that term broadly to mean someone who “acts in opposition to the complainant.” Mission KwaSizabantu v. Benjamin Rost, Case No. 2000-0279 (WIPO June 7, 2000). Others have limited the term to parties who vie commercially with each other in the same industry, offering the same or similar goods or services. Tribeca Film Center Inc. v. Lorenzo Brusasco-Mackenzie, Case No. 2000-1772 (WIPO April 10, 2000). This Panel favors the second view, concurring with the panel in Britannia Building Society v. Britannia Fraud Prevention, Case No. 2001-0505 (WIPO July 8, 2001) that to accept the interpretation first above described would “render so many parties ‘competitors’ as to dilute the Policy’s bad faith requirement beyond recognition.” Clearly, Respondent here is not vying with Complainant for customers or business in the online dating industry, offering his services as alternatives to those offered by Complainant. His redirect customer, Tinder, may compete with Complainant but Respondent is in the pay-per-click business and thus does not. In the absence of actual commercial competition between Complainant and Respondent, Respondent here cannot be considered a competitor for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).

Even if Complainant and Respondent were deemed competitors for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii), it does not appear that Respondent registered the Domain Name primarily for the purpose of disrupting Complainant’s business. On the contrary, the evidence is fairly clear that Respondent’s primary purpose in registering the Domain Name was not to disrupt the business of a commercial adversary but instead to attract internet traffic to his web site by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his site, as discussed above in the context of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent’s conduct does not fall within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).

That said, using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a web site which automatically redirects traffic to the web site of a competitor is still bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin – This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a confusingly similar domain name to disrupt the business of a complainant by redirecting traffic to the web site of a competitor is sufficient evidence of bad faith to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Respondent’s primary intent in registering and continuing to use the Domain Name is less important than the effect of his conduct. Respondent knew or should have known the disruptive impact his conduct would have upon Complainant’s business. Respondent went forward with his plans in spite of that and this demonstrates bad faith independently of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Red Wing Shoe Company, Inc. v. wei zhang / Magdalena Jennifer / Mu Yan / Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA1911001873163 (Forum Jan. 3, 2020).

Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when he acquired the Domain Name sometime between December 2015 and February 2016 (historical record contained in Exhibit A). Complainant’s JSWIPE mark was being used by it in commerce since at least as early as 2014 (Complaint Exhibits E and F). It is somewhat unique and whimsical in nature, yet Respondent copied it into the Domain Name exactly and caused it to redirect traffic to the web site of an entity which operates in the same market as Complainant. The nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith and registering (or acquiring)[ii] an identical or confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in an incorporated mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm’cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent’s contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant’s rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).

For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

DECISION

Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <jswipe.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist

May 10, 2021

[i] PopSockets LLC v. san mao, FA 1740903 (Forum Aug. 27, 2017) (finding disruption of a complainant’s business which was not directly commercial competitive behavior was nonetheless sufficient to establish bad faith registration and use per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)), Love City Brewing Company v. Anker Fog / Love City Brewing Company, FA 1753144 (Forum Nov. 27, 2017) (Finding that Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by pointing Internet users to an expired webpage. This may create the perception that Complainant is closed, never existed, or is not a legitimate business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).).

[ii] The WHOIS report included in Complaint Exhibit A shows that the Domain Name was created in 2013. For purposes of a UDRP bad faith analysis, however, the relevant date is the date on which the respondent acquired the domain name. EMindful Inc. v. Yao Chang, FA 1825435 (Forum Feb. 20, 2019) (“The date on which the current registrant acquired the Domain Name is the relevant date in assessing bad faith.”)


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Comments

2 Responses to “JSwipe.com : Jewish dating app maker wins #domain in UDRP”
  1. David says:

    How could Jswipe.com register the domain in bad faith if the domain was registered in 2013
    and jswipeapp.com was registered in 2014 and TM request of registration is way after that?

  2. DomainGang says:

    David – Exactly. The panelist pointed out (in that footnote) that the Respondent is not the same person that registered the domain in 2013. That is accurate. In fact, the late Lonnie Borck owned JSwipe.com between 2013-2015.

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